

Across Cultural Borders

Historiography in Global Perspective

Edited by
Eckhardt Fuchs
and
Benedikt Stuchtey



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Comparing Cultures in Intercultural Communication

Jörn Riisen

The quest for intercultural communication in history is rooted in practical challenges. It is not free academic thinking that has brought about the problems we have to deal with, but practical needs of a general and fundamental importance. So I will begin with a few words about these practical challenges, and then, in my second part, develop some theoretical considerations concerning how to meet and to answer these challenges through intercultural communication. In the third and last part of the chapter I will outline some ideas on how to bring about intercultural communication in the special field of historiography. The challenge on which my argument focuses is ethnocentrism, sharpened and radicalized by modernization and antimodernism.

ETHNOCENTRISM

After 1989 the world of politics faced a deep crisis of orientation and a quest for a new global orientation. How do we have to look at the human world in general, in the broad perspective of world politics, and find a new pattern of orientation? Samuel Huntington's idea of "The Clash of Civilizations" has provided a remarkable and intensively debated proposal for a new paradigm of world politics coming from the United States; in the meantime, it has been enlarged from a widely debated article to a thick book, recently translated into German.¹ Huntington says that

since the end of the cold war, we have been living in a situation in which different civilizations (I would prefer the category "cultures") are in severe tension—a "clash." This clash, Huntington claims, will be the most important factor of world politics in the future. He warns us to be aware of this decisive cultural factor and to prepare ourselves to manage it. This simply means that we have to win the battle by concentrating our strength against those cultures that are different from ours, mainly the Islamic and the Confucian ones. (In a threatening and paranoid vision—worthy of the next Hollywood blockbuster film and of psychoanalytic treatment—Huntington draws a horrific picture of a threatening alliance of the Islamic and the Confucian world against the West.)

This famous and widely discussed concept is much more indicative of a problem of general orientation today than of a solution to it. It points to a problem that can be described on a more theoretical level as one of ethnocentrism as a cultural strategy of political orientation and identity construction. Speaking of a "clash" as a basic structure of intercultural relationship reveals large-scale ethnocentrism. It is by no means only a phenomenon of the West in its relationship to non-Western cultures. Instead, it is universal and anthropologically rooted in the depth of the human mind, close to nature. To say it philosophically: Every human has to realize a relationship to him/herself in which it distinguishes him/herself from others, thus gaining its identity as a necessary cultural condition for life. Ethnocentrism² is a widespread cultural strategy to realize collective identity by distinguishing one's own people from others. It simply means a distinction between the realm of one's own life as a familiar one from the realm of the lives of the others, which is substantially different; it also realizes this distinction with values that put a positive esteem into one's own group and a negative one into the other group (under specific conditions of self-criticism the valuations can be reversed).³

Ethnocentrism defines one's own identity by a specific distinction from the others': The otherness is placed beyond the limits of one's own form of life in such a way that the value system that regulates our relationship with our own people is different from the value system we use to deal with the others. We tend to attribute mainly positive values to ourselves; the contrary is true concerning the otherness of the others. Otherness is a negative reflection of ourselves. We even need this otherness to legitimate our self-esteem.⁴

A very remarkable finding in history and anthropology demonstrates this unequal evaluation in identity construction by the strategy of ethnocentrism. Most of the names that denigrate the social unit to which one belongs, and to whose form of life one feels committed, simply mean "man" or "mankind." The others are not humans. Let me enumerate some of these names: Khoi-khoi, Bantu, Egyptian, Apache, Comanche.

This naming indicates ethnocentrism. Human values are concentrated in one's own group, and otherness is defined by a lack of them, or even worse, by something contrary to them.

Identity construction along the lines of this strategy of ethnocentrism inevitably leads to a clash of different collective identities. This clash is grounded on the simple fact that the others do not accept our devaluation; on the contrary, they assign negative values to us. The point of this deeply rooted and widely realized strategy of togetherness and separation from others is the tensional impact in its relationship between the two fundamental realms of togetherness and difference, of selfness and otherness. The clash is logically built in to this cultural strategy itself. The last word in the cultural relationship between different communities guided by ethnocentrism will be struggle, even war in the sense of Thomas Hobbes's description of the natural stage of social life (*bellum omnium contra omnes*).

Here lies the challenge. If we were to follow this logic of identity construction, which has been historically valid for many parts of the past in different countries, the clash of civilizations would be the last word in intercultural relationship. What does "clash" mean? Huntington illustrates it by a scenario of conflict and war. And indeed, war is only a physical realization of the cultural principle of ethnocentrism in identity construction. We start on the mental level with words and ideas; in the end weapons, blood, and death speak the language of the same strategy. We all know the challenging cases we have to look at: Yugoslavia, Rwanda, Chechnya, Tibet, the killing of foreigners in Algeria, xenophobia in Europe. It is all around us, and this is what I mean when I say we have practical challenges of intercultural communication. We have, of course, paradigmatic historical examples. The most negative and the most impressive and horrible one is, of course, the Holocaust. Is there no alternative?

Before I try to answer this question, I would like to sharpen our awareness of ethnocentrism by shortly featuring it in respect to modernity and antimodernity.

Modernization has brought about a very specific and complex form of ethnocentrism: a globalization of the Western way of life, in which a universalistic approach of rationality to cultural orientation of human life has become dominant. It has changed the lives of the people in most of the non-Western countries in a dramatic way, and it has been a threat to them up to the present. Globalization poses a threat to their cultural peculiarity, in the form of a universalizing rationality of European origin. This domination is largely perceived as a threat of losing one's own traditionally pre-given identity.

This rationality puts the variety of human forms of life under the unity-

ing force of technological progress, market economy, methodical rationality in the sciences, and other mechanisms of rationalization. This rationalization is often seen as nothing but a globalization of Western forms of life that allows no place for different cultures. In this respect modernization is a threat to difference and variety in culture, the threat of the "fury of desolation" (*die Furie des Verschwindens*), to quote Hegel's critique of the political rationality of the French Revolution. This threat has even been felt in Western self-understanding itself: Max Weber spoke of an "iron cage" in which cultural creativity would be throttled.⁵ Modernization has been discussed as a "tragedy of culture," and the two world wars were seen as a horrible proof of it.⁶

This threat of modernization should not lead to a plea for postmodernism, because *antimodernism*, which at least partly includes postmodernism, is a threat of cultural identity as well. One should not overlook that in the countermovement against the constraints of modernization there is an urge to establish an order that radically denies the universalizing principles of modernity by stressing the uniqueness of a particular form of life. It uses the potentials of modernity in order to establish an antimodern system and to make it effective. Modernization has brought about an antiuniversalist approach to particular identity, guided by the principle of ethnocentrism. This reaction to modernity is visible not only in non-Western countries, but can and has also occurred as a turn of modernity against itself. Both types of reaction again bring about a "dash of civilizations." We have two main examples for this threat: Nazism and fundamentalism. I do not think that the Holocaust and the Nazi policy reflect the substance and essence of modernity. On the contrary, Nazism is a substantially antimodernist movement using essential elements of modernity simply as means and not as goals of development. It is exactly this antimodernist modernity that made Nazism so horrible and dangerous, so explosive and destructive. The same dialectics govern the different fundamentalist movements and their antimodernism today.

So we find ourselves confronted with an open problem: an unbridgeable gap between cultural difference and a universalistic discourse. We are left with an open question—must we decide in favor of cultural particularity or in favor of transcultural universality? I think this binary choice is disastrous. So here we have a theoretical challenge the humanities have to meet and to which an answer must be found.

HISTORY AND IDENTITY

The search for an answer brings history to the fore, since history is the most important cultural strategy of bringing about and expressing iden-

tity. History is a medium of self-understanding, of expressing, articulating, and even forming one's own identity, and of shaping the otherness of those outside of one's own group. It represents the past as a mirror in which we can see the features of our world and ourselves in their temporal dimension. This is true for the individual person, as well as for group identity—for national, for gender, and for cultural identity. Identity is always delivered by history; it is shaped and formed, even constituted by memory and historical consciousness. Identity is the answer to the question of who I am or who we are. If we have to answer such a question, we usually do it by telling a story, by a historical narrative.

Concerning cultural identity, I would like to emphasize certain narratives that formulate and even bring about this wide range of collective identity. They are called *master narratives*. Master narratives are told in order to answer the question of cultural identity. In the Western world we now have a strong postmodernist criticism of master narratives, the most famous of which is presented by François Lyotard.⁷ His declaration of the end of master narratives indicates a crisis of identity in the Western world. I doubt that there will be no further master narratives of the West, since master narratives belong to cultural identity. But in one respect Lyotard is right: We need structurally new narratives that tell us who we are now, since we do not simply remain what we have been in the past.

Historical narratives do not only present one's own cultural identity, but, of course, at the same time they describe the difference and otherness of the others. And here is a problem concerning the master narratives (not only of the West, because other cultures have their master narratives as well). Master narratives normally are universal histories.

In their universalistic attitude, master narratives allow no place for otherness (or at least only a very uncomfortable one). They integrate it into the patterns of the home culture (as a variant or an early stage or an example for general rules we feel committed to)—or they exclude it marginally, to wilderness and threat, or academically, to objects of ethnology. So what else does history bring about besides ethnocentrism?

If we want to move beyond the ethnocentric logic of identity construction, we cannot leave history, but we have to look for transgressing chances within it. The first chance is found in narratives that present historically identity-claimed truth because they are an important element in practical human life. They really deal with the substance of the people, with their social interrelationship. They must be plausible across all the differences of the people who share a common identity. They must be accepted when they present or interpret a pre-given social order. Without such a social consent on the ground of plausibility of the master narratives, a given social entity could not survive culturally. So history as a cultural practice of identity construction is essentially more than only an

invention or fiction. Therefore the strategies of self-understanding and interpreting one's own world by telling historical narratives always include methodical elements to make their presentation of the past plausible. (These elements are traditionally called rhetoric.)

We have to look very carefully at these built-in truth claims of historical narratives, because here is a chance and a starting point for the intercultural communication we are asking for. I think this claim to truth is universal, and truth itself is universalistic in its nature. It belongs to the formal logical structure of historical narrative. I would therefore like to argue that historical narratives can bridge the gap between universalism and particularity by their truth claims.

Truth in history is not a single principle but a very complex relationship of different principles. It is related to different dimensions and realms of historical narratives. It is related to experience, to values, and to patterns of historical sense and meaning.⁹

I will not give any further details, but I can indicate only in general that truth is a matter of methodological regulation of thinking and I will pick up only one issue of this methodological regulation: the method of intercultural comparison.

Truth is a basic regulative idea of argument. It constitutes a dynamic discourse that is directed to understanding and consent (including consent on differences). Pursuing this kind of argumentation would be a cultural practice that contributes to solving the problem of mediating universality and cultural particularity.

But before I try to develop the principles of this mediation, I have to criticize a widespread concept of universality in historical thinking. I think of universality as a simple generalization of one's own particularity into a concept of universal history that, of course, marginalizes or even dissolves the otherness of the other. This has been the cognitive strategy of traditional world history, threatening those who are not willing to subsume themselves under a generalized self of the others. We can study it in most of the concepts of universal history (and not only in the West).

But I don't think that every concept of universality is nothing more than a generalized peculiarity excluding or suppressing otherness. There are some principles of conceptualizing historical narratives that take the other perspectives seriously. One is *criticism* in the relationship between different perspectives. We can use the different perspectives to move knowledge forward through criticism. Criticizing one perspective by means of another will bring both perspectives into movement, into change, in which they modify or even enrich each other. So criticism can lead to *integration*, which is the second strategy of conceptualization I would like to emphasize. We can sustain the difference, and by argument

bring the perspectives into movement toward a comprehensive perspective that allows space for the differences and the dignity of the otherness.

This mutual enrichment is possible only under a certain condition that is expressed by the universalistic category of equality. The discussants have to concede each other the same reason of arguing, an equality in using reasons for the plausibility of their narratives. But this equality is not sufficient. It is abstract because it neglects the differences that shape the perspectives. Identity is not a question of what we have in common, but what makes us differ from each other and how it does so. This insistence on difference does not dissolve equality; it only leads us beyond it. We have to add a second principle to the category of equality, the principle of mutual recognition and acknowledgment of differences.

This principle of mutual recognition and acknowledgment of differences under the precondition of equality is very abstract, very philosophical. It is synchronic and in its simple form even timeless. So it has to be applied to change and development in the field of historical culture.

INTERCULTURAL COMPARISON

In the third and last part of this chapter I would like to carry out such an application in a special field of historical studies, namely intercultural comparative historiography.⁹

Traditionally, intercultural comparison in historiography is done in the following way: We start with a comprehensive idea of Western historiography and its development from Herodotus up to our time. Then we look at another culture and study its similarities and differences.

The logic of this comparison is clear: Here are we and there are the others, and the whole comparison is grounded on division and separation, guided implicitly by the logic of ethnocentrism. How can we avoid this?

First of all we should avoid a presupposition of comparison that appears at first to be a self-evident matter of treating cultures as the largest units of identity. An intercultural comparison presupposes cultures as the subject matter of its work. It is an open question, how these units of comparison should be looked at. Are there pre-given entities, well distinguished in time and space? If an intercultural comparison uses a theoretical framework, it has to be very careful not to start from problematic presuppositions. This can be easily shown with respect to sense criteria that constitute historical thinking in general. These sense criteria are an essential part of a cultural code that defines the units of comparison. Consequently cultures can and should be compared along the line of the fundamental concepts that define the forms and realms of reality and human self-understanding. These concepts, which we call the cultural

code, are deeply rooted in the minds of people. The danger of the attempt to focus cultural differences on this code is its tendency to substantiate or even to reify the single cultures being compared. Their internal historicity, their manifold interferences and mutual conditionings are lost from sight. Comparison then is only a statement of dichotomy or clear alternatives: Historical thinking either follows this code or another one. The related forms of cultural identities look like spatial realms with clear borders. Nothing seems to exist beyond or across the single codes. Such a way of looking at cultures shares with ethnocentrism the essential factor of exclusion: cultures are clearly separated and exclude each other. A typology of cultural differences is methodically necessary as a hypothetical construct, but it has to avoid the constraints and misleading views of a concept of cultures as pre-given units and entities.

Now I would like to propose a method of theoretical conceptualization that avoids ethnocentrism as well as the presupposition of comparison that excludes cultures from one another. Ethnocentrism is theoretically dissolved if the specifics of a culture are understood as a combination of elements that are shared by all other cultures. Thus the specificity of cultures is brought about by different constellations of the same elements. The theoretical approach to cultural differences that is guided by this idea of cultural specifics does not fall into the trap of ethnocentrism. On the contrary:

1. It presents the otherness of different cultures as a mirror that enables us for a better self-understanding.
2. It does not exclude otherness in order to constitute the peculiarity of our own cultural features, but includes it.
3. It brings about an interrelationship of cultures that enables the people who have to deal with their differences to use the cultural power of recognition and acknowledgment.

Historiography as the subject matter of comparison is a manifestation of historical consciousness that cannot be understood without going back to a complex set of prepositions, circumstances, challenges, and functions that together shape its peculiarity. How is it possible to compare peculiarities? It is necessary to decompose them into their ingredients and reconstruct them as a specific relationship and synthesis of various elements. If it can be shown that these elements, or at least some of them, are the same in different manifestations of historiography, a comparative analysis can be done in a systematic way. So the first step to creating a theoretical parameter for comparing historiography is a theory of the main components of these specific cultural manifestations called historiography.

In order to do this, one has to identify anthropological universals in the

works and results of historical consciousness. This universality consists of a specific experience of time and a specific mode of dealing with this experience. It is an experience of time that can be called "contingency." Contingency means that human life is embedded in a course of time that always irritates human life. It is the irritation of rupture, of unexpected occurrence in one's own world, like death and birth, catastrophes, accidents, disappointed expectations—in short it is the experience that can be described by Hamlet's words: "The world is out of joint;—O cursed spite that ever I was born to set it right!"¹⁰ "To set it right" means to develop a concept of the course of time, of temporal change and development, which makes sense of contingent occurrences with respect to the orientation of human activities vis-à-vis the continual changes to the world and to the people in question.

The experience of temporal change that structurally threatens human life and disturbs the concept of an unproblematic ongoing familiar process in one's own life and world, must be interpreted in order to adjust human activities and thought to it.¹¹ In order to do so people must insert disturbance into an idea of temporal order that gives an answer to the challenge of contingency. The work of historical consciousness can be described as a procedure by which the idea of a temporal order to human life is brought about. It deals with the experience of temporal change of life and world, which is stored in the halls of memory. It provides a sense of change by interpretation that can be applied to the understanding of today's world. Thus it enables people to expect the future and to guide their own activities by this future perspective according to the experiences of the past.

This work of historical consciousness is accomplished in specific activities of cultural life. I would like to call these the practices of historical narration. Through these practices "historiography" becomes a part of human life, a part of culture as a necessary element of the human form of life. Any intercultural comparison must systematically account for these practices and has to interpret their specific forms of the universal cultural activity of making sense of the past.

This activity of narration has a mental counterpart: "history" as a mental construct, in which the past is present as a determination or orientation of present-day life including its future perspective. What are the substantial elements of this mental construct called "history"? In order to distinguish it from the other elements of human memory, one should first of all explicate its specificity as a memory of a past, which goes beyond the limits of one's own personal recollection or (more objectively) beyond one's own lifespan. This temporal extension of memory is a necessary condition for giving the past the quality of being "historical." A perspective on futurity, opened by historical consciousness, transcends the limit

of one's own lifespan as well. Historical consciousness enlarges the mental concept of the temporal dimension of human life into a temporal whole that goes far beyond the lifetime of the people who do the historical work of recollection.

The simple enlargement of the temporal horizon of memory is a necessary though not sufficient condition for the specific "historical" quality of going back to the past. The human mind has to fill this dimension with a specific "sense," which makes the past as experience significant for the present and future. This "historical sense" is an image, a vision, a concept, or an idea of time that mediates the expectations, desires, hopes, threats, and anxieties moving the minds of the people in their present-day activities with the experiences of the past. Recalled real time becomes synthesized with the projected time of the future; past and future merge into an entire image, vision, or concept of temporal change and development that functions as an integral part of the cultural orientation in the human life of the present. Examples for this idea of time as a meaningful order of human activities are the idea of regular and incessant change of order and disorder, the category of progress, the belief that God governs the world, or that there is an entire moral world order (such as *Tao*).

All these concepts are based on the idea of the order of time. So time concepts are the basis or the foundation of the sense of history; time related to the human world and its precarious balance between the experience of the past and the expectation of the future preforms any sense and meaning of the past as history. For comparative purposes a basic dichotomy has often been used: the difference between cyclic and linear time. This distinction as a simple alternative is not very useful to characterize fundamental modes of historical thinking, since there is no concept of history that does not make use of both of them. So the emphasis of disclosing characteristic time concepts should be directed to the modes of synthesis of cyclicality and linearity of time.

The comparative outlook on historiography has to identify these criteria of historical sense and meaning. Normally they do not occur in an elaborated form. Very often they are implicit principles or highly effective presuppositions—all the more reason to identify and explicate them. So a system of basic concepts can be explicated, governing the entire historiography, structuring its way of transforming the experience of the past into a meaningful history for the present. By such a system the semantics of history will be disclosed and prepared for comparison.

Today, these sense criteria are mainly considered to be fictional, inventions that have nothing to do with the reality. In this view the cultural creativity of historical consciousness is recognized, unfortunately, in a one-sided way, since one cannot deny the element of experience that moulds the mental construct called "history" as well as the images, sym-

bols, and concepts used to interpret it. Very often these interpreting elements are a part of the experience itself, so it is misleading to identify, explicate, and interpret them as being substantially fictional.

A typology of historical sense criteria is only a starting point of a theoretically conceptualized intercultural comparison of historical thinking. It has to be elaborated into a complex theory of historical conscience, which I am unable to present here. I only can enumerate the main points of this theoretical framework of comparison. It has to explicate the different possibilities of cultural practices of historical narration (in the wide range from dancing a myth to writing academic historiography). It has to deal with the linguistic and nonlinguistic forms of presentation and with the functions of representing the past in practical life.

These categories of comparison are synchronic. One has to complement them by diachronic perspectives, which refer to change in historiography. Here the main issue is a comprehensive direction of change.

Max Weber's concept of universal rationalization and disenchantment should be reformulated as a question for a comparative analysis of historiography. There is no historiography without rationality, that is, a set of rules, which bind the sense-making processes of historical consciousness into strategies of conceptualization, of bringing empirical evidence into the representation of the past, and of coherent argumentation. This rationality should be reconstructed and investigated with regard to its development toward the growing universality of its validity. The same should be done in respect to the norms and values that constitute historical identity. Do they show a directed development, which can be described as a process of universalization, and does the spatial extension of historical identity develop accordingly? I think we can observe such a process of universalization in many cultures:¹² It starts from a small social group in archaic times and leads to mankind in modern history. Alongside this universalization very often a corresponding regionalization takes place. Additionally one should look for a process of particularization and individualization; it may be a reaction to universalization or a consequence of it.

To give you an example of a theoretically conceptualized framework of diachronic comparison, I sketch a universal periodization of historical thinking that mainly relates to the media of historical narration and the elements of contingency and sense criteria of temporal change, and that makes use of my typology of historical narration (see figure 13.1).¹³

This kind of thinking follows the rules required to transcend the limits of ethnocentrism. I would like to characterize these rules as commitments to *reflect*, to *historicize*, and to *universalize* the basic principles and determinants of historical thinking. With this strategy we should undertake a new approach to intercultural communication that could contribute to a historical culture of recognition and acknowledgment.

Figure 13.1 Universal periodization of historical thinking

Prehistoric	Sharp distinction between paradigmatic time of world order ("archaic" time of myth) and the time of everyday human life; the latter is meaningless for the order of world and self. Contingency is radically sorted out. Dominance of the traditional type of historical narration. Medium of oral tradition.	
Historic	Traditional	The entire order of time has a divine character. Religion is the main source for sense of temporal change. Dominance of the exemplary type of historical narration.
	Modern	Minimization of transcendent dimension of time-order. The entire sense of history tends to become inner-worldly. Human relationality is able to recognize it with the means of methodical research of the empirical evidence of the past. Dominance of the genetic type of historical narration.
Posthistoric	No comprehensive order of time including past, present, and future. The past is separated into a time for itself. Facts of the past become elements of arbitrary constellations that have no substantial relationship to present and future. The human past becomes de-temporalized. Contingency loses its conceptualization by ideas of temporal order valid for present-day life and its future. Medium of electronics.	

Note: The typology of historical sense generation used here is explained in Jörn Rüsen, *Zeit und Sinn: Strategien historischer Denkens* (Frankfurt am Main: 1990), 153–230; Jörn Rüsen, *Studies in Metahistory* (Pretoria: 1993), 3–14. I have put three of the four types of historical sense-making into a clear periodical order. This is misleading since they play a much more complex role in all periods. But nevertheless they can be used to characterize an epoch-related type of historical thinking.

NOTES

1. Samuel Huntington, "The Clash of Civilizations," *Foreign Affairs* 72 (1993): 22–49; Samuel Huntington, *The Clash of Civilizations and the Remaking of World Order* (New York: 1996); translated into German under the title *Der Kampf der Kulturen: The Clash of Civilizations: Die Neugestaltung der Weltpolitik im 21. Jahrhundert* (Vienna: 1996).
2. I use the word in a more general sense, not in its strict anthropological meaning where it is related to an identity focused on the social unit of a tribe.
3. Sato Masayuki provides illustrating examples of cartography: "Imagined Peripheries: The World and Its Peoples in Japanese Cartographic Imagination," *Diogenes* 44, no. 1 (Spring 1996): 132ff.
4. Compare Erich Neumann, *Tiefenpsychologie und neue Ethik* (Frankfurt am Main: 1985), 38ff. An excellent description of this ethnocentric attitude, based on broad-scale ethnographic evidence, is given by Klaus E. Müller, "Identität und Geschichte: Widerspruch oder Komplementarität? Ein ethnologischer Beitrag," *Palaearctica* 38 (1992): 17–29.
5. Max Weber, *Die protestantische Ethik: Eine Aufsatzsammlung*, ed. Johannes Winkelmann (Gütersloh: 1965), 188.
6. Compare Friedrich Jaeger, "Bürgerlichkeit: Deutsche und amerikanische Philosophien einer Lebensform zu Beginn des 20. Jahrhunderts," in *Wege zur Geschichte des Bürgertums*, ed. Klaus Tenfelde and Hans-Ulrich Wehler (Göttingen: 1994), 171–206.

7. François Lyotard, *Jean-François Lyotard: Das Postmoderne Wissen: Ein Bericht* (Graz: 1986).
8. Compare Jörn Rüsen, *Historische Vernunft: Grundzüge einer Historik*, vol. 1, *Die Grundlagen der Geschichtswissenschaft* (Göttingen: 1983); Joyce Appleby, Lynn Hunt, and Margaret Jacob, *Telling the Truth About History* (New York: 1994).
9. Compare Jörn Rüsen, "Some Theoretical Approaches to Intercultural Comparison of Historiography," *History and Theory*, theme issue 35 (1996): 5–22. In what follows, I repeat the main arguments of this article.
10. Shakespeare, *Hamlet*, Act I, Scene V, 189sq.
11. In Chinese it is expressed by the term *pieri* (change with meaning of turmoil).
12. I have tried to conceptualize such a process in respect to the question for the universality of human rights and the general issues of humankind, selfness, and otherness. See Jörn Rüsen, "Die Individualisierung des Allgemeinen," in Jörn Rüsen, *Historische Orientierung* (Cologne: 1994), 168–74; Jörn Rüsen, "Human Rights from the Perspective of a Universal History," in *Human Rights and Cultural Diversity: Europe—Arabic-Islamic World—Africa—China*, ed. Wolfgang Schmale (Frankfurt am Main: 1993), 28–46; Jörn Rüsen, "Vom Umgang mit den Anderen—Zum Stand der Menschenrechte heute," *Internationale Schulbuchforschung* 15 (1993): 167–78.
13. Rüsen, "Some Theoretical Approaches," 20.